DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 255 409 SO 016 285

AUTHOR Cortese, Anthony J.
TITLE The Inception, Evolution, and Current State of the Moral Development School of Lawrence Kohlberg.
PUB DATE Aug 84
NOTE 24p.; Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Association (79th, San Antonio, TX, August 27-31, 1984). For related document, see SO 016 286.
PUB TYPE Viewpoints (120) -- Speeches/Conference Papers (150) -- Information Analyses (070)

EDRS PRICE MF01/PC01 Plus Postage.
DESCRIPTORS Cognitive Measurement; Cognitive Structures; *Developmental Stages; Learning Processes; *Moral Development; *Philosophy; Science History; Social Sciences; *Social Theories
IDENTIFIERS *Kohlberg (Lawrence); Kuhn (Thomas)

ABSTRACT

Tiryakian's "school" approach is used to analyze the evolution of Kohlberg's study of moral development over the past 25 years. The first part of the paper contrasts the paradigm approach (Kuhn 1970) to the schools approach in defining the development of the social sciences. Specifically, Kuhn's definition of a paradigm ("universally recognized scientific achievements that for a time provide model problems and solutions to a community of practitioners") is contrasted with Tiryakian's components of a "school" (a small community of intellectuals integrated around a central figure and a paradigm of empirical reality which is subject to investigation). Tiryakian suggests that the "schools" approach, rather than the "great man" or "key concepts/theories" approaches, more adequately defines the development of the social sciences and what social scientists actually do. The next section addresses the question of how the moral development school originated, by looking at how Piagetian structuralism provided theoretical direction for Kohlberg's dissertation at the University of Chicago. The socio-historical context of this work, the development of moral education programs, and changes in the field through the ideas of different members of the group are then covered. The concluding section deals with the present state of the school and discusses the major members of the school, the division of labor among them, challenges from outside the school, and possible future directions. (IS)

****
* Reproductions supplied by EDRS are the best that can be made *
* from the original document. *
****

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION
EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)
This document has been reproduced as received from the person or organization originating it.
Minor changes have been made to improve reproduction quality.
Points of view or opinions stated in this document do not necessarily represent official NIE position or policy.

"PERMISSION TO REPRODUCE THIS MATERIAL HAS BEEN GRANTED BY
A.J. Cortese
TO THE EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)."

ED255409

THE INCEPTION, EVOLUTION, AND CURRENT STATE OF THE MORAL DEVELOPMENT SCHOOL OF LAWRENCE KOHLBERG[1]

Anthony J. Cortese

Colorado State University

SP 016 285

Running Head: Moral Development School

Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Association (79th, San Antonio, TX, August 27-31, 1984).

THE INCEPTION, EVOLUTION, AND CURRENT STATE OF THE MORAL DEVELOPMENT SCHOOL

Abstract

According to Kuhn, it remains a question what parts of social science have yet acquired paradigms. Cognitive development, as spawned by Piaget, appears to have acquired paradigmatic status. Kohlberg's theory of moral reasoning and method (standard form scoring) define a school in the study of morality. Using the Tiryakian "schools" approach, Kohlberg's research team at Harvard is analyzed. The origins, rise, and components of the school are outlined. It is concluded that although the Harvard school still spawns a great deal of research in moral judgment, there is competition from the social learning paradigm and from anomalies and schisms within the school.

THE INCEPTION, EVOLUTION, AND CURRENT STATE OF THE MORAL DEVELOPMENT SCHOOL

Prior to Kuhn's (1970) significant work, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, science was generally viewed as an ongoing and anonymous enterprise of cumulative development. That presupposition resulted in the practice of science merely as a tool for reproducing knowledge. Reproduction, in turn, may result in dogma which reinforces the illusion of scientific progress. Kuhn (1970, p.2) indicates that "Perhaps science does not develop by the accumulation of individual discoveries and inventions." Rather, the growth of science seems to be much more uneven and discontinuous. No longer is it accepted that science can be totally objective or that scientists are busy discovering "what is really out there." Instead, science can be regarded as a microcosm of society. The scientist can no longer see him/herself as separate from the object of investigation.

What fuels the development of scientific disciplines are general methodological innovations rather than either new theoretical models or new empirical observations (Tiryakian, 1979). Such methodological infusions are the contributions of a small number of major "schools." Tiryakian argues for a schools approach to the development of the social sciences rather than the widely used "great man" or "key concepts/theories" approaches. Neither of the latter two perspectives are adequate explanations of how the social sciences have developed (i.e., not by individual achievements) or what social scientists actually do (not all social scientists are theorists).

What are the components of a school? A school is a small community of intellectuals whose origin and formative period can be localized in time and space. Tiryakian adds that a school is integrated around a central figure, an intellectual, charismatic leader, and a paradigm of empirical reality which is subject to investigation. Kuhn (1970, p. viii) refers to paradigms as

"universally recognized scientific achievements that for a time provide model problems and solutions to a community of practitioners." A paradigm signals satisfactory consensus in a discipline on (a) problems requiring explanation, (b) theoretical presuppositions for such explanations, (c) methods of measurement, and (d) types of research design which allow other scholars to do studies meaningful to all concerned. It is the leader-founder who imparts a new method to approach social reality. The leader is surrounded by a small entourage of close colleagues and students. Members of schools typically collaborate to provide empirical validation of the basic conceptualization or "message" as transmitted by the leader. At the school's onset, intense contact between the leader and students is crucial. As the school institutionalizes, commitment to its core ideas are no longer dependent upon face-to-face interaction between the leader and students.

A new paradigm implies a change in the rules governing the practice of normal science. When research does not "perform in the anticipated manner, revealing an anomaly that cannot, despite repeated effort, be aligned with professional expectation" (Kuhn, 1970, p.6), a new paradigm emerges. Thus, it is crisis in normal science that permits the possibility of a new paradigm to develop and eventually replace the reigning paradigm. The assimilation of a new paradigm in a discipline "requires the reconstruction of prior theory and the reevaluation or prior fact, an intrinsically revolutionary process that is seldom completed by a single man and never overnight" (Kuhn, 1970, p.7). Consequently, there is a division of labor in schools. In addition to leader, there may be lieutenants (younger students who are the main agents of institutionalization and who will later have the task of training a new generation), an interpreter (a person who translates the paradigm to outsiders so that they can see the relevance of the message), an organizer, an auxilior (who

assists the school in getting visibility and support but who makes little if any intellectual contributions), and a patron (or sponsor). A school usually has institutional affiliation and support at an excellent university. The university is typically located in a large and diverse metropolis where mass communication is readily available. A school also has means of regularly publishing its research in a journal, series, or press. Finally, a school's reality is also provided by means of a doctrine in the nature of a professional specialty or basic way of perceiving and relating to the world" (Ingleton, 1974, p.22). There is a cohesive aspect to a school's [illegible] Members tend to feel that they have come upon a [illegible] account [illegible] of the universe. In sum, the two most basic elements of a school are an effective social network and a shared paradigm, a scientific research program (SRP, Lakatos, 1974). Ingleton favors the use of the term "SRP" over the term "paradigm." "Paradigm", apparently, does not capture the dynamics of a school's communication network or research activities.

In looking at how [illegible] parts of social science have yet adopted paradigms at all. "To be accepted as a paradigm, a theory must seem better than its competitors, but it need not, and in fact never does, explain all the facts with which it is confronted" (Kuhn, 1970, p.18). The school approach is used to analyze Kohlberg's study of moral development over the past twenty-five years. In the following section the question of how the moral development school originated is addressed. This entails a look at how Piagetian structuralism provided theoretical direction for Kohlberg's dissertation at the University of Chicago. The socio-historical context in which the school emerged is examined in the second section. What was the controversy or conflict in the discipline that served as a key for starting a new collective identity for researchers? In that part, we investigate how the socio-historical context

contributed to the rise of the school. In the third section, we focus on the school's moral education program and how anomalies of the SRP were handled. The fourth part is directed toward a new phase in the school's SRP methodology. In the conclusion we contrast the Harvard Center for Moral Education as a Piagetian school and discuss the current state of Kohlberg's school. We now turn to a look at the Piagetian roots of the moral development school.

Piaget

Piaget coined the term "moral judgment" (Piaget, 1965). He defines his problem area as identifying the basic logical structures or stages underlying child's judgments. Piaget describes how these structures transform or develop. The general assumptions of structuralism are as follows:

1. Stages imply distinct or qualitative differences in children's modes of thinking or of solving the same problem at different stages.
2. These different modes of thought form an invariant sequence, order, or succession in individual development. While cultural factors may speed up, slow down, or stop development, they do not change the sequence.
3. Each of these different and sequential modes of thought forms a "structured whole." A given stage response on a task does not just represent a specific response determined by knowledge and familiarity with that task or tasks similar to it; rather it represents an underlying thought-organization....
4. Cognitive stages are hierarchical organizations. Stages form an order of increasingly differentiated and integrated structures to fulfill a common function (Piaget, 1960, pp. 13-15).

This discussion of the stage concept later becomes, in Tiryakian terminology, the basis for the presuppositions of Kohlberg's school of moral development.

Piaget also launched methods for investigating moral judgment in individuals. He used the clinical method, presenting hypothetical dilemmas to provoke fresh reasoning on the part of subjects through their discussions and responses. Piaget also observed children's game behavior, paying close attention to their conception of game rules. He applied dimensions (e.g., moral realism, immanent justice, distributive justice, retributive vs. restitutive punishment) in moral judgment to investigate underlying thought structures in children. Piaget also provided basic data and initial assertions in the direction of empirical tests of a cognitive developmental theory. The theory assumes that children in the age they construct and solve moral problems are determined largely by their concepts of fairness. Although Piaget did not provide a complete scientific research program, he left behind the underpinnings for what would later become the most extensively used paradigm in cognitive developmental research (Kohl, 1971, p.6).

Like Piaget, Kohlberg assumed that the child was an active agent in the moral sphere of social reality. This was in direct contrast with the social learning paradigm. According to social learning, children's conceptions of morality are merely acquiescently mastered assertions of adult ethical cliches. Kohlberg sought to universalize and go beyond such internalized models where imitation, cultural relativity, and the teaching of value content were stressed. He reintroduced a social evolutionary doctrine (Spencer, 1899; Hobhouse, 1906; Dewey and Tufts, 1908) that had been discarded in anthropology and replaced with a paradigm of cultural relativism. Accordingly, structures of moral thought can be traced along an evolutionary range from simple to complex. Kohlberg had been drawn to the cognitive developmental premise of structuralism before reading Piaget while "doing diagnostic and research work examining unconscious and affective structures from a psychoanalytic framework" (Kohlberg,

1979, p. vii). However, for Kohlberg, psychoanal was inadequate for distinguishing between unconscious mental struct and culturally conforming responses. Serious problems of interpretation exi ed. One danger of psychoanalysis is its potential for creating the lem which it is designed to cure. The Piagetian approach, however, offered great promise. Mental structure seemed to be readily identifi

Kohlberg (1958) examined the adequacy of Piaget's theory of moral development, revising Piaget's first three stages and adding fourth, fifth and sixth stages. Kohlberg also turned to Dewey (1908), Dewey (1964), Mead (1934), and especially Baldwin (1906) for theoretical guidance. Although his dissertation director, Helen Koch, was not particularly interested in the area of moral development, Kohlberg was strongly influenced by Piagetian theory through Sarale Martin, in the Department of Philosophy, and Anselm Strauss, in the Department of Sociology at the University of Chicago (Kohlberg, personal correspondence, June, 1980). Later (1967), Kramer (1968), Rest (1968), and Blatt (1969) at Chicago and Turiel (1969) at Yale also conducted their dissertation research in moral development.

The Socio-Historical Context

Kohlberg's early work (from 1958 to the early sixties) received little attention from the scientific community. Tiryakian (1979, p.217) indicates that a school in its formative years "may be looked down upon by the larger scientific community, ignored or repudiated for being nonscientific" (which may amount to no more than deviating from normal science). Many academicians held a contempt for studying cognition. American psychology in the 1950s and 1960s was dominated by behaviorism, ranging from radical behaviorism to social learning theory. In contrast, Kohlberg argued that patterns of behavior are developmental and that reasoning has an underlying stage structure.

Though not radical by today's standards, at the time "the possibility of examining cognition was hotly debated, as was the notion that there were developmental trends in human behavior" (Rest, 1979, p.7). The political arena at the time also helped to suppress Kohlberg's SRP. In the Eisenhower era, morality was associated with "stodgy moralists, muddleheaded do-gooders, and Communist-hunters" (Rest, 1979, p.3). Yet Kohlberg continued his structural examination of morality.

Kohlberg and Turiel collaborated to replicate Kohlberg's dissertation studies in other cultures: Turkey, Taiwan, and Yucatan. Turiel (1966) published an article based on his dissertation which tested the stage-order hypothesis. He assessed adolescents' moral judgments. Turiel found that subjects exposed to the adjacent higher stage would assimilate judgments more than would subjects exposed to stages two above or one below their own. Since then, evidence has suggested that judgments one-third of a stage higher than their own produces optimal assimilation (Berkowitz et al., 1980). For example, a person pretested at stage 3(4) is exposed to stage 4(3) and assimilates to the latter stage.

In Kohlberg's (1958) dissertation, stages were viewed not as true stages but as Weberian ideal type moral orientations (Kohlberg, 1979). Turiel's research and the cross-cultural studies did not validate stages since they used data based on group means. The premier direct evidence of the hypothesis of stage hierarchy is provided in Rest's (1969) dissertation.

By the mid-1960s the study of cognition became a major interest in psychology. This interest paralleled a growing societal concern for moral issues. Social events such as the Civil Rights Movement, the Vietnam War, the Women's Movement, and later, Watergate focused attention on social justice. Kohlberg's SRP began to be viewed as a salvational panacea for a conflict-ridden society which demanded ethical progress and for a contemporary psychology in crisis.

Kohlberg (1969) published "Stage and Sequence: The Cognitive-Developmental Approach to Socialization". The lengthy chapter includes supportive data from the cross-cultural studies and research of Rest. At the time, this optimistic statement provided the moral developmental school with a proclamation, a new mode of interpreting social reality.

> In 1969,...Kohlberg's Center for Moral Development at Harvard was just the place to entertain audacious grand schemes. The Center was filled with energetic activity; there was a sense of being in the vanguard of a new psychological and educational movement.... Behaviorism was losing its hold on the field of personality and social development, ...soon much interest...would be directed towards the processes and organization of thinking.... Kohlberg had disregarded Behavioralism's edicts and had a wealth of ideas for extending Piaget's...approach.... The apathy of psychologists toward the study of morality was changing. The Civil Rights Movement, the student protests, and the debate over the Vietnam War dramatized how differently people think about the issues of social justice. Psychological studies of moral thinking seemed more and more important and relevant (Rest, 1979:xvii-xviii).

The preceeding passage clearly indicates the social relevance and salvational message of Kohlberg's school. Nevertheless, individual longitudinal data was still needed to validate the invariant sequence of stage structure. Moreover, methodologically, the reliability of the research instrument had yet to be established. But the spirit of the manifesto was one of confident steady advance in the cognitive developmental paradigm. The six moral stages were posited to form an order of increasing cognitive adequacy (Kohlberg, 1971a). Later, they were described as different kinds of social perspectives (Kohlberg, 1976).

Moral Education

Besides research, the Harvard school became a leading advocate of moral education programs based on the SRP's core ideas. The proclamation on developmental research was proceeded by an equally programmatic statement using the research findings as the lead into educational policy (Kohlberg, 1971b). This objective brought Kohlberg, Rest, and Blatt from Chicago and Turiel from Columbia to Harvard for what eventually became the Center for Moral Education. Kohlberg came to Harvard in 1967.

Moral education programs were introduced in schools and prisons, and were used for the maintenance of a "just community" school (Kohlberg and Mayer, 1972). There is a strong case for the applicability of moral education in personal life, thus giving such programs a wide range of implications. The programs are geared to develop the capacity to make well-reasoned, adequate judgments. The terminal point in moral judgment for most individuals is at the conventional level. Generally people do not reached principled or postconventional morality. Yet moral decisions are becoming increasingly difficult and complex in modern society (e.g., Olympic boycotts, presidential races, Baby Does, the relationship between ecology and economic development, international relations, race relations, technologocal "advance," the draft, nuclear conflict, world population and birth control, euthanasia, and the wide range of lifestyles). In Kohlbergian moral education programs moral growth is stimulated through sound individual decision-making and social cooperation.

In terms of research, the first task of the Harvard School was to attend to some major chinks in the SRP. These anomalies could be seen as cracks in the theory, the methodology, or both. Kohlberg and Kramer's (1969) analysis of longitudinal data yielded enough anomalies to warrant ample revision of stage

definitions and scoring method. Numerous cases of regression and stage-skipping were found. These disconfirming data had not been available at the time when Kohlberg's optimistic manifesto was written. The cases of regression were first seen as a failure to support the invariant sequence of stage structure. However, in further analysis (Kohlberg, 1973; Turiel, 1974) the problem was reinterpreted as a "failure in the details of both stage definition and of measurement method" (Kohlberg, 1979, p. ix).

Although Kohlberg's dissertation was an exploratory assessment method, the data suggested the method to be high on inter-rater and internal consistency reliability. But the temporal stability of the method (test-retest and parallel form reliability) had not been set. Kurtines and Greif (1974) published a widely accepted critique of Kohlberg's SRP. But there were serious problems with their evaluation. First, it is not scientifically legitimate to use standards from one methodology (i.e., psychometric) to evaluate the worth of data generated from another methodology (i.e., clinical) (Broughton, 1975; Turiel, 1978). Second, it is not logical to simultaneously question both the theory and the method (Broughton, 1975, p.81; Kohlberg, 1979, p.x). Finally, in terms of negative heuristics, the review was too late. Kohlberg and Turiel had already concluded that the method was inadequate and had begun to revise it in 1968.

The New Research Phase

A significant shift within the school occurred in 1970. Kohlberg's manifesto, along with Rest's research and the cross-cultural data, had "delineated the broad outlines of culturally universal qualitative patterns of development of moral judgment and demonstrated the fruitfulness of the cognitive-developmental theoretical assumptions for research" (Kohlberg, 1979, p.x). Besides the elated sense of being on the cutting-edge, much theorizing had

gone beyond a solid data base. "Aside from the volumes of theoretical speculation, a reader could go through all the hard data in a weekend" (Rest, 1979, p.xviii). Consequently, a second phase of research focusing on method, the construction of a valid and reliable assessment of moral judgment, had begun. Rest left Harvard and took a position at the University of Minnesota to further this phase of research.

With the steady growth of moral judgment literature has come the reinterpretation and revision of: the cognitive-developmental approach, Kohlberg's six-stage theory, and the method of assessing moral judgment. The stage concept, the invariant sequence, and the relation between behavior and reasoning have been reformulated. Stage definitions have been refined. A seventh stage has tentatively been added (Kohlberg, 1981). The work on the scoring system has proceeded slowly, going through numerous transformations. The current standard issue (or form) system is expected to be basically permanent (Colby et al., in press).

To summarize, the cognitive developmental study of moral judgment began in Geneva with Piaget's investigation of children's conceptions of game rules. Kohlberg (1958) relied on Piagetian theory in a probing study to identify developmental modes of moral judgment observed in Chicago school children. Further studies followed. Turiel experimentally tested for the sequentiality of developmental stages in children's moral judgments. Kohlberg and Turiel conducted cross-cultural studies in an attempt to validate the moral stages. Rest's (1969) dissertation seemed to provide empirical support for the hierarchical integration of stage structure. Kohlberg (1969) used data from these studies to brace his theoretical formulations on moral reasoning in an optimistic statement. This proclamation was used to counter the claims of the behaviorist paradigm that had earned hegemonic status in psychology in the

1950s and 1960s. Kohlberg established a moral development school at Harvard. The school was viewed as being in the vanguard of research on moral cognition. Despite the strong impact of Kohlberg's proclamation, problems remained. Up to this point, although the theoretical formulations were influential, there was little empirical evidence for claiming that Kohlberg's stages were true stages according to cognitive developmental premises. Kohlberg and Kramer (1969), in an analysis of longitudinal data, discovered an excessive number of anomalous cases of retrogression and stage skipping. Consequently, Kohlberg became skeptical about the invariant sequence of moral stages. After redefining several stages, Kchlbergwas convinced that there are serious methodological problems but that the theory is basically sound. The Harvard school enter a new phase of research. The objectivewas to establish a valid and reliable method of assessing moral stages.

Rest went to Minnesota and developed an objective measure of moral comprehension and preference, the Defining Issues Test (DIT) as part of the methodological phase of research. At Harvard, Colby receive a research grant from the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development for a longitudinal analysis of Kohlberg's subjects and to review the scoring manual. The main results of this project were a monograph (Colby et al., 1983), published by the Society for Research in Child Development, and the Standard Form Scoring manual (Colby et al., in press). Kohlberg (1981) also published a monograph, a collection of essays on the philosophy of moral development. In the concluding section, we shall consider the Harvard Center for Moral Education as a school in the Tiryakian sense.

Conclusion

Under the charismatic leadership and intellectual guidance of Kohlberg, a school of moral development was founded at Harvard in the late 1960s.

Kohlberg's cognitive developmental approach to [illegible] offered a new perspective and method for viewi[illegible] has had a major impact on contemporary psychol[illegible] its salvational message has had a salient infl[illegible] social issues of justice and in the implementa[illegible] Kohlberg worked with Turiel, Rest, Blatt, Kram[illegible] core of the school's first generation. The s[illegible] characterized by a division of roles and an i[illegible] the third generation, the social network becomes more diffuse. Members leave, take appointments at other institutions, send new recruits to the founder, and generally carry on the SRP (e.g., Rest at Minnesota, Gibbs at Ohio State).

Besides Kohlberg, the current core at Harvard includes Colby, Gilligan, Lieberman, and Candee. The entire history of the school reflects a great deal of collaborative effort in research among Kohlberg and his colleagues. This close working relationship, a true communitas, is perhaps the single most important aspect that identifies and justifies the school approach to the development of the social sciences. Kohlberg's numerous jointly published articles and essays represent the ideal relat[illegible] and student characteristic of "schools."

In terms of labor division, Candee takes [illegible] He knows the SRP as an insider but translates [illegible] can see the relevance of the message. Candee [illegible] role of pragmatic organizer at Harvard's annua[illegible] At the workshop, persons ranging from undergra[illegible] represent a wide variety of disciplines come t[illegible] presuppositions, theory, and especially metho[illegible] are statistics, research design, and data anal[illegible]

and a large diverse metropolitan setting. Although the "school" does not have its own press, much of the school's work is published by the university press of Harvard, Cambridge, and Chicago. In conclusion, Kohlberg's research team appears to constitute a school as formulated by Tiryakian.

There appears to be increasing doubts about the adequacy of Kohlberg's approach. There is the issue of methodology, the validity and reliability of the research instrument (Cortese, 1984). There are also scoring problems. The procedures are not standard as the name implies. In addition, the temporal stability of the instrument is not always consistent. Perhaps the biggest criticism is a lack of predictive validity. There is an apparent gap between moral judgment and behavior.

in applying themselves to the concerns of others (Wallach and Wallach, 1983).

The social learning paradigm is regaining appeal. It seems to be a compelling alternative to Kohlberg's framework. Social learning has a much better track record for predicting behavior. The insertion of cognitive elements in social earning models have strengthened its influence in contemporary psychology. There are also splits in the Harvard school. Gilligan argues that women tend not to center on rights or principles, but rather on the possibility of omission, of not helping others when one could help them. Kohlberg's scoring system is not geared toward scoring moral judgments which deal with a failure of response. Since Kohlberg's stages were derived from an all male sample, it is easy to grasp why deviance from the male standard is seen as a failure to develop.

[redacted]

Kohlberg has a forthcoming monograph that replies to major critics of his theory. But there are still problems with Standard Issue Scoring, the current measurement technique (Cortese, 1984). But the competing psychoanalytic and social-learning paradigms also suffer from egoism. Both make the basic premise that human beings are exclusively concerned with personal outcomes. What is outside the self has little significance. All three of these psychological schools lend support to selfishness. Perhaps paradigmatic status will be found in a model that views behavior as being motivated by social interest, a sense of purpose external to the self.

References

Baldwin, J.: Social and ethical interpretations in mental development (Macmillan, New York 1906).

Berkowitz, M., Gibbs, J., Broughton, J.: The relation of moral judgment stage disparity to developmental effects of peer dialogues. Merrill-Palmer Quarterly 26:341-357 (1980).

Blatt, M.: Studies on the effects of classroom moral discussion upon children's moral development; PhD thesis, University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois (1969).

Broughton, J.: The cognitive-developmental approach to morality: a reply to Kurtines and Greif. J. of Moral Education 8:81-96 (1975).

Colby, A., Kohlberg, K., Candee, D., Gibbs, J., Hewer, A., Kaufman, K., Power, C., Speicher-Dubin, B.: The measurement of moral judgment (Cambridge University Press, New York in press).

Colby, A., Kohlberg, L., Gibbs, J., Lieberman, M.: A longitudinal study of moral development: a monograph for the society of research in child development (University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1983).

Cortese, A.: Standard issue scoring of moral reasoning: a critique. Merrill-Palmer Quarterly 4:27-68(1984).

Cortese, A.: Horizontal Décalage in Moral Development: a Principal Components Analysis (in review).

Dewey, J.: Selected writings; in Archambault, John Dewey on education: selected writings (Random House, New York 1964, a posthumously published collection: original writings in 1895).

Dewey, J., Tufts, J.: Ethics (Henry Hold and Co., New York 1908).

Gibbs, J., Widaman, K., Colby, A.: Construction and validation of a simplified, group-administerable equivalent to the moral judgment interview. Child Development 53:895-910 (1982).

Gilligan, C.: In a different voice: essays on psychological theory and women's development (Harvard University Press, Cambridge 1982).

Hobhouse, L.: Morals in evolution: a study in comparative ethics (Chapman and Hall, Ltd., London 1906).

Kohlberg, L.: The development of modes of moral thinking and choice in the years 10 to 16; unpubl. PhD thesis, University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois (1958).

Kohlberg, L.: Stage and sequence: the cognitive-developmental approach to socialization; in Goslin, Handbook of socialization, theory and research, pp. 346-480 (Rand McNally, New York 1969).

Kohlberg, L.: From is to ought: how to commit the naturalistic fallacy and get away with it in the study of moral development; in Michel, Cognitive development and epistemology, pp. 151-235 (Academic Press, New York 1971a).

Kohlberg, L.: Stages of moral development as a basis for moral education; in Beck, Crittenden, Sullivan, Moral education: interdisciplinary perspective (University of Toronto Press, Toronto 1971b).

Kohlberg, L.: Continuities in childhood and adult moral development revisited; in Baltes, Schaie, Life-span developmental psychology: personality and socialization (Academic Press, New York 1973).

Kohlberg, L.: Moral stages and moralization: the cognitive-developmental approach; in Lickona, Moral development and behavior, pp. 31-53 (Holt, Rinehart, & Winston, New York 1976).

Kohlberg, L.: Forward to Development in judging moral issues; in Rest, pp. vii-xvi (University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis 1979).

Kohlberg, L.: Essays in moral development, vol. 1: the philosophy of moral development (Harper & Row, San Francisco 1981).

Kohlberg, L.: Essays in moral development, vol 2: the psychology of moral development (Harper & Row, San Francisco in press).

Kohlberg, L., Kramer, R.: Continuities and discontinuities in childhood moral development. Hum. Dev. 12:93-120 (1969).

Kramer, R.: Moral development in young adulthood; unpubl. PhD thesis, University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois (1968).

Krebs, R.: Some relations between moral judgment, attention and resistance to temptation; unpubl. PhD thesis, University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois (1967).

Kuhn, T.: The structure of scientific revolutions (University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1970, originally published 1962).

Kurtines, W., Greif, E.: The development of moral thought: review and evaluation of Kohlberg's approach. Psychological Bulletin 81:453-470 (1974).

Lakatos, I.: Falsification and methodology of scientific research; in Lakatos, Criticism and the growth of knowledge; pp. 91-195 (Cambridge University Press, New York 1974).

McDougall, W.: An introduction to social psychology (Metheun, London 1908).

Mead, G.: Mind, self, and society (University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1934).

Piaget, J.: The general problems of the psycho-biological development of the child; in Tonner, Inhelder, Discussions on child development, vol. 4 (International Universities Press, New York 1960).

Piaget, J.: The moral judgment of the child (Free Press, New York 1965, originally published 1932).

Rest, J.: Hierarchies of comprehension and preference in a developmental stage model of moral thinking; unpubl. PhD thesis, University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois (1969).

Rest, J.: Development in judging moral issues (University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis 1979).

Rushton, J.: Altruism, socialization, and society (Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs 1980).

Spencer, H.: The principles of ethics, vol. I (D. Appleton and Co., New York 1899).

Tiryakian, E.: The significance of schools in the development of sociology; in Snizek, Contemporary issues in theory and research: a metasociological perspective, pp. 211-233 (Greenwood, Westport 1979).

Turiel, E.: An experimental test of the sequentiality of developmental stages in the child's moral judgments; unpubl. PhD thesis, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut (1965).

Turiel, E.: An experimental test of the sequentiality of developmental stages in the child's moral judgment. J. of Personality and Social Psychology 3:611-618 (1966).

Turiel, E.: Conflict and transition in adolescent moral development. Child Development 45:14-29 (1974).

Turiel, E.: Social regulations and domains of social concepts; in Damon, New directions for child development: social cognition, No. 1, pp. 45-74 (Jossey-Bass, San Francisco 1978).

Wallach, M., Wallach, L.: Psychology's sanction for selfishness (W. H. Freeman & Co., San Francisco 1983).

1. Preparation of this paper was supported by a grant from the National Endowment for the Humanities (#FS-20713-83). The author would like to express his appreciation to Larry Kohlberg, Ed Tiryakian, and Michael Wallach whose timely discussions and insights contributed to the development of the paper.

Anthony J. Cortese
Department of Sociology
Colorado State University
Fort Collins, CO 80523

Key Words: Moral development, Cognitive development, Kohlberg, Piaget, Paradigm.